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Abstract
This paper analyzes a class of infinite-time-horizon stochastic games with singular
controls motivated from the partially reversible problem. It provides an explicit so-
lution for the mean-field game (MFG), and presents sensitivity analysis to compare
the solution for the MFG with that for the single-agent control problem. It shows
that in the MFG, model parameters not only affect the optimal strategies as in the
single-agent case, but also influence the equilibrium price. It then establishes that the
solution to the MFG is an -Nash Equilibrium to the corresponding N -player game,
with  = O
(
1√
N
)
.
1 Introduction
The seminal work on fuel follower problem and its variants by Benesˇ, Shepp, and Witsen-
hausen [BSW80] is one of the landmarks in the theoretical development of singular controls
(see also [BC67]). The simple and insightful solution structures have inspired many follow-up
works in stochastic controls. See, for instance, [BS92], [EKK88], [HW87], [Kar83], [SS89],
and [DZ94]. Such problems have had a wide range of applications, including economics and
finance [DN90], [SS94], [SS95], [JJZ08], [MZ08] and [Ste12], operations research [GKTY11],
and queuing theory [VW85] and [AB06].
Recently, the pioneering works of [LL07] and [HMC06] on mean-field games (MFGs)
provide an ingenious aggregation approach for analyzing the otherwise notoriously hard
N -player stochastic games, and have motivated exponentially growing research interests in
both theory and applications. See for instance [BFY13], [CD18a], [CD18b], [GLL11], [LL07],
and the references therein. However, a majority of the theoretical developments in MFGs
are within the framework of regular controls which are absolutely continuous, with few
exceptions, including [Lac15] which formulates a controlled martingale problem to establish
the solution for a more general class of MFGs with possibly discontinuous controls.
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Compared to regular controls, singular controls that are allowed to be discontinuous
provide a more general mathematical framework. Though more natural for practical en-
gineering and economics problems, singular controls are more challenging, especially for
deriving explicit solutions: studying singular control problems involves analyzing additional
(possibly state-dependent) gradient constraints to the underlying Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation. Moreover, the Hamiltonian for singular controls of the finite variation type
diverges and the standard stochastic maximal principle fails.
To overcome these technical difficulties for MFGs with singular controls, [FH17] adopts
the notion of relaxed controls and the techniques developed in [Lac15] to prove the existence
of solutions to MFGs with singular controls in a finite-time horizon, with approximation
analysis from MFGs with purely regular controls. Under the finite-time horizon setting,
[CGL17] establishes an -Nash Equilibrium (-NE) approximation of N-player games with
singular controls of finite variation by MFGs with singular controls of bounded velocity.
Still, very little is known on the solution structure of MFGs with singular controls, except
for the recent work of [GX19]. They study MFGs of fuel follower problem and derive explicit
solutions by exploiting symmetric structure in the cost functional. However, due to this
symmetry, the optimal strategy for the MFG in [GX19] coincides with that for the single-
agent control problem, i.e., the fuel follower problem in [BSW80], with no demonstrated
game effect.
Indeed, there are essential technical difficulties for deriving explicit solutions without cer-
tain symmetry structures in MFGs with singular controls. For instance, for a non-stationary
MFG, the time-dependent mean information process leads to a parabolic HJB equation
instead of an elliptic type, even in an infinite-time horizon game. This is different from
classical control problems with infinite-time horizon. Moreover, the probabilistic approach
of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) does not work easily for the
infinite-time horizon case.
Our work. In this paper, we analyze a class of infinite-time-horizon MFGs with singular
controls, without symmetric cost structures. We take the partially reversible investment
model in [GP05], formulate its MFG counterpart, provide an analytical solution to the
MFG and study the difference between this MFG with its corresponding single-agent control
problem, as well as its relation with the associated N -player game.
More specifically, the control problem in [GP05] is formulated for a class of real option
problems originated in the classical work of [DDP94]. It is an optimization problem for a
company whose revenue is based on the production level of a certain commodity, modeled by
a geometric Brownian motion. The company can decrease its production level with a savage
value and increase its production level with an investment cost, hence the term “partially
reversible investment”. That is, the dynamics of the production level at time t is given by
dxt = xt(δdt+ γdWt) + dξt, x0− ∼ µ0,
where µ0 ∈ P2(R), and the control ξt representing the cumulative change in the production
level by time t is singular. The problem is to find an optimal investment strategy ξt over an
appropriate control set in order to maximize its overall expected net profit
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π(xt)dt− γ+dξ+t − γ−dξ−t ]
]
.
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Here, the discount rate r > 0, Π(·) the revenue function satisfies the usual Inada condition
for utility functions, γ+ and γ− are the unit costs of increasing and decreasing the production
level respectively, subject to some technical conditions for the well-posedness of the problem.
In the MFG framework, instead of one company, we consider a continuum of infinitely
many indistinguishable companies reacting to the market. We assume that the revenue
function f is affected by the aggregated production level made by all the companies on the
market, i.e., the game interaction among companies is through the revenue function f . We
analyze explicitly this MFG, and compare in details this MFG and the single-agent control
problem when the revenue function is of the Cobb-Douglas type. In particular, we show that
model parameters in the MFG impact both the optimal strategies (as in the single-agent
case), and the equilibrium price. We then formulate the corresponding N -player game, and
establish that this MFG solution is an approximation to the N -player game in the -NE
sense, with  = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Impact of mean-field interaction via explicit solution. There are earlier works on
explicitly solving MFGs with regular controls and on analysis of game effect. For instance,
[CFS15] studies the systemic risk characterizing interaction among banks with common
noise. It shows that the mean-field interaction creates stability quantified by the systemic
risk. [LZ19] shows that heterogeneity among players and the common noise have significant
impact on the solution structure of MFGs. In particular, without common noise or the
heterogeneity, the mean-field interaction would be factored out of the optimization problem
of individual players and the equilibrium strategy in MFGs solution would be similar to the
single-agent control problem case.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 reviews the classical partially reversible investment
problem and formulates mathematically the corresponding MFG; Section 3 presents a full
derivation of an explicit solution to the MFG, provides sensitivity analysis with respect to
model parameters, and compares the MFG with the single-agent control problem; Section 4
connects this MFG with the associated N -player game.
2 Problem formulation
2.1 Preliminary: partially reversible investment problem
The basic idea of the partially reversible investment problem goes as follows. A company
profits from producing and selling a commodity. The revenue function depends on the
production level with fluctuations according to, for instance, the market demand. The
company has the flexibility to adjust its production level at any time, with the expansion
incurring a cost and the contraction bringing a smaller salvage value. The objective of the
company is to choose an optimal investment strategy in terms of its production level to
maximize the overall expected net profits.
In [GP05], this partially reversible investment problem is formulated as follows. Take
a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) supporting a standard Brownian motion
W = {Wt}t≥0. Assume that FW is the augmented filtration generated by W that satisfies
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the usual condition. The production level of a company xt at time t is characterized by a
geometric Brownian motion with an initial distribution µ0 ∈ P2(R) such that
dxt = xt(δdt+ γdWt), x0 ∼ µ0,
where δ, γ > 0 are drift and volatility coefficients, representing respectively the average and
fluctuation in market demand. The production level can be adjusted at any time t, and
possibly in a discontinuous fashion such that
dxt = xt(δdt+ γdWt) + dξt, x0− ∼ µ0, ξ0− = 0. (1)
Here, ξt = ξ
+
t − ξ−t , ξ±0− = 0 with ξ+· and ξ−· adapted and nondecreasing ca´dla´g processes
representing the accumulated increased and decreased production level by time t respectively.
(Note that when the control is of finite variation, such decomposition of ξ· by ξ+· and ξ
−
· is
unique).
The objective of the company is to adjust its production level xt according to a policy
ξ· = (ξ+· , ξ
−
· ) chosen from an appropriate admissible control set U , in order to maximize its
discounted expected total profit over an infinite-time horizon. That is to find
v(x) = sup
(ξ+· ,ξ−· )∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[Π(xt)dt− γ+dξ+t − γ−dξ−t ]
∣∣∣∣x0− = x] , ∀x > 0. (2)
Here the discount rate r > 0, Π(·) the revenue function satisfies the standard Inada condition
for utility functions, γ+ = p > 0 is the unit investment cost to increase production level,
and −γ− = p(1− λ) is the unit gain for reducing production level, with λ ∈ (0, 1) to ensure
no-arbitrage.
Finally, the admissible control set U is
U ={(ξ+· , ξ−· ) : ξ+· , ξ−· nondecreasing ca`dla`g processes adapted to FW ,
ξ+0− = ξ
−
0− = 0, E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtdξ+t
]
<∞, xt ≥ 0.
}
(3)
In [GP05], the smooth fit principle in the sense of [BSW80] is established via regularity
analysis for the value function, and the optimal control ξ∗· = (ξ
∗,+
· , ξ
∗,−
· ) to (2) is shown to
be of bang-bang type. Moreover, the value function is shown to be the unique classical C2
solution to the following Hamilton-Jacobian-Bellman (HJB) equation,
0 = min{rv − Π(x)− δxv′ − 1
2
γ2x2v′′, p− v′, v′ − p(1− λ)}, (4)
where v′ and v′′ denote the first and second order derivatives of v respectively.
When the revenue function Π(x) is of the Cobb-Douglas type, i.e., Π(x) = cρxα with
constants ρ > 0, c > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), then the optimal control is characterized by two
thresholds 0 < xb < xs <∞, which are explicitly given by
xb =
{
2cα(yn0−yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n−α)[yn0−(1−λ)y0]
} 1
1−α
ρ
1
1−α ,
xs =
{
2cαy1−α0 (y
n
0−yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n−α)[yn0−(1−λ)y0]
} 1
1−α
ρ
1
1−α ,
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where
m = −
(
δ
γ2
− 1
2
)
−
√(
δ
γ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
γ2
, n = −
(
δ
γ2
− 1
2
)
+
√(
δ
γ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
γ2
,
and y0 > 1 is a root of the following equation
1− λ = (n− 1)(α−m)y
m−1(yα − yn) + (1−m)(n− α)yn−1(ym − yα)
(n− 1)(α−m)(yα − yn) + (1−m)(n− α)(ym − yα) .
The value function is then derived by solving the following QVI via the smooth fit principle,
p− v′ = 0, x ≤ x < xb,
rv − cρxα − δxv′ − 1
2
γ2x2v′′ = 0, xb ≤ x ≤ xs,
v′ − p(1− λ) = 0, x > xs.
This bang-bang type of control, that is, the optimal control ξ∗· characterized a pair of thresh-
old (xb, xs), suggests that the company should spend the minimum effort to keep its produc-
tion level within the interval [xb, xs].
2.2 Formulation of MFG
It is natural to consider the game version of this partially reversible investment problem. We
will first consider an MFG in which there are infinite number of rational and indistinguishable
companies, and derive an explicit solution to this MFG. We will then compare this (much
simpler) MFG with the single-agent problem (in Section 3.2), and study its relation with the
corresponding N -player game (in Section 4).
Let (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space supporting a standard Brow-
nian motion W = {Wt}t≥0. Assume that FW is the augmented filtration generated by W
that satisfies the usual condition. As in the single-agent control problem, in the MFG a
representative company adjusts its production level xt according to a policy chosen from
the admissible control set U defined in (3) to maximize its discounted total profit over an
infinite-time horizon,
sup
(ξ+· ,ξ−· )∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[f(xt, µ)dt− pdξ+t + p(1− λ)dξ−t ]
∣∣∣∣x0− = x] , ∀x > 0, (MFG)
subject to
dxt = xt(δdt+ γdWt) + dξ
+
t − dξ−t , x0− ∼ µ0. (5)
Unlike the single agent problem, the revenue function for a representative company in this
game (MFG) depends on both its own production level x and the aggregation of all other
companies, denoted by a probability distribution µ. More precisely, f(x, µ) the revenue
function of a Cobb-Douglas type takes the form of f(x, µ) = F (µ)xα for some α ∈ (0, 1),
with µ being the distribution of the production level in the long run, i.e., µ = Law(x∞). If
we consider the inverse demand function, then the price will be given by
ρ = ρ(µ) = EX∼µ[ρ˜(X)] =
∫
(a0 − a1y1−α)µ(dy),
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and F (µ) = cρ(µ). Effectively one can write
f(x, µ) = cρxα.
Note that in this MFG companies interact through the revenue function f . It is also worth
noting that, unlike the revenue function for the single-agent control problem in Section
2.1 where the unit price ρ is exogenously given and fixed, here in the game (MFG) ρ is
endogenously determined.
We will look for a solution to the (MFG) in the following sense.
Definition 2.1. If there exists a control ξ∗· = (ξ
+,∗
· , ξ
−,∗
· ) ∈ U and ρ∗ > 0 such that
1. Under ρ∗, ξ∗· is an optimal control for
v˜(x) = sup
(ξ+· ,ξ−· )∈U
Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[cρ∗xαt dt− pdξ+t + p(1− λ)dξ−t ]
∣∣∣∣x0− = x] , ∀x > 0, (6)
subject to (5).
2. Under ξ∗· the controlled process x
∗ = {x∗t}t≥0 given by
dx∗t = x
∗
t (δdt+ γdWt) + dξ
+,∗
t − dξ−,∗t , x∗0− ∼ µ0 (7)
admits a limiting distribution Px∗∞ and ρ
∗ =
∫
(a0 − a1y1−α)Px∗∞(dy).
then the control-mean pair (ξ∗· , ρ
∗) is said to be an NE solution to the game (MFG).
To ensure the well-posedness of (MFG), we assume 2δ + γ2 < r and 2δ
γ2
6∈ {α, 1}.
Remark 2.2. There is an alternative and equivalent definition of the solution to the game
(MFG) . That is, for any fixed ρ ∈ R, we may define
v˜(µ0) = sup
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U
Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
cρxαt dt− pdξ+t + p(1− λ)dξ−t
]]
subject to (5). Then these two solutions are equivalent in the sense that v˜(µ0) = Eµ0 [v˜(x0−)].
3 Explicit solution to MFG
3.1 Solution to the game (MFG).
We shall now solve the game (MFG), with the fixed-point approach as in [LL07].
6
Step 1. Control problem under fixed mean information. Fix a ρ > 0, then the
game (MFG) is a singular control problem,
v˜(x) = sup
(ξ+· ,ξ−· )∈U
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[cρxαt dt− pdξ+t + p(1− λ)dξ−t ]
∣∣∣∣x0− = x] , x > 0, (Control)
subject to (5). The dynamic programming principle leads to the following HJB equation
associated with the problem (Control) under the fixed ρ,
0 = min{rv˜ − cxαρ− δx∂xv˜ − 1
2
γ2x2∂xxv˜, p− ∂xv˜, ∂xv˜ − p(1− λ)}. (8)
Similar to the argument in [GP05], we see that the optimal policy is a bang-bang type
and is characterized by an expansion threshold x˜b and a contraction threshold x˜s so that
xt ∈ [x˜b, x˜s] almost surely.
More precisely, at time t = 0, if x ∈ (0, x˜b), then ξ+0 = x˜b − x and ξ−0 = 0; if x ∈ (x˜s,∞),
then ξ+0 = 0 and ξ
−
0 = x − x˜s. Note that x0 = x0− + ξ+0 − ξ−0 ∈ [x˜b, x˜s]. For t > 0, it is
optimal to impose a minimum amount of adjustment so that xt ∈ [x˜b, x˜s].
Accordingly, the solution v˜ is of the form
v˜(x) =

px+ C1, 0 ≤ x ≤ x˜b,
Axm +Bxn +Hxα, x˜b < x < x˜s,
p(1− λ)x+ C2, x˜s ≤ x,
where x˜b = inf{x : ∂xv˜(x) = p}, x˜s = sup{x : ∂xv˜(x) = p(1 − λ)} with 0 < x˜b ≤ x˜s (see
Lemma 4.4 in [GP05]), and since it is assumed that 2δ + γ2 < r and hence δ < r,
m = −
(
δ
γ2
− 1
2
)
−
√(
δ
γ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
γ2
< 0, n = −
(
δ
γ2
− 1
2
)
+
√(
δ
γ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
γ2
> 1,
H =
2cρ
γ2(n− α)(α−m) .
Moreover, by the smooth-fit principle, we have
Ax˜mb +Bx˜
n
b +Hx˜
α
b = px˜b + C1,
mAx˜m−1b + nBx˜
n−1
b + αHx˜
α−1
b = p,
m(m− 1)Ax˜m−2b + n(n− 1)Bx˜n−2b + α(α− 1)Hx˜α−2b = 0,
Ax˜ms +Bx˜
n
s +Hx˜
α
s = p(1− λ)x˜s + C2,
mAx˜m−1s + nBx˜
n−1
s + αHx˜
α−1
s = p(1− λ),
m(m− 1)Ax˜m−2s + n(n− 1)Bx˜n−2s + α(α− 1)Hx˜α−2s = 0.
(9)
Some algebraic manipulations yield
A =
p(n− 1)x˜b − α(n− α)Hx˜αb
m(n−m)x˜mb
=
p(1− λ)(n− 1)x˜s − α(n− α)Hx˜αs
m(n−m)x˜ms
; (10)
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Figure 1: y0 increases along with λ.
and
B =
p(m− 1)x˜b − α(m− α)Hx˜αb
n(m− n)x˜nb
=
p(1− λ)(m− 1)x˜s − α(m− α)Hx˜αs
n(m− n)x˜ns
. (11)
Furthermore, denote y0 =
x˜s
x˜b
and y0 ≥ 1. By (10) and (11), we have{
p(n− 1) [(1− λ)y0 − ym0 ] = α(n− α)Hx˜α−1b (yα0 − ym0 ) ,
p(m− 1) [(1− λ)y0 − yn0 ] = α(m− α)Hx˜α−1b (yα0 − yn0 ) ,
(12)
(13)
and
(n− 1)(α−m)ym−10 (yα0 − yn0 ) + (1−m)(n− α)yn−10 (ym0 − yα0 )
(n− 1)(α−m)(yα0 − yn0 ) + (1−m)(n− α)(ym0 − yα0 )
= 1− λ. (14)
Now, to show that there exists a y0 for (14), define F (y) for y > 1 that
F (y) =
(n− 1)(α−m)ym−1(yα − yn) + (1−m)(n− α)yn−1(ym − yα)
(n− 1)(α−m)(yα − yn) + (1−m)(n− α)(ym − yα) .
Since limy→1+ F (y) = 1, limy→∞ F (y) = 0, and F is continuous, there exists a y0 > 1
satisfying F (y0) = 1 − λ ∈ (0, 1) (see also Figure 1). Note that the function F does not
depend on ρ, therefore y0 is independent of ρ. From (13), we can conclude that
x˜b =
{
2cα(yn0 − yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n− α) [yn0 − (1− λ)y0]
} 1
1−α
ρ
1
1−α . (15)
where
{
2cα(yn0−yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n−α)[yn0−(1−λ)y0]
} 1
1−α
does not depend on ρ, and
x˜s = x˜by0 =
{
2cαy1−α0 (y
n
0 − yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n− α) [yn0 − (1− λ)y0]
} 1
1−α
ρ
1
1−α . (16)
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After plugging in (15) and (16), A and B are given by (10) and (11), respectively, and
C1 = Ax˜
m
b +Bx˜
n
b +Hx˜
α
b − px˜b, C2 = Ax˜ms +Bx˜ns +Hx˜αs − p(1− λ)x˜s.
To justify that the above analytical solution is indeed the solution to the problem
(Control), one way is via the verification theorem, see for instance [GX19]. Alternatively,
one can first show that the value function is the unique viscosity solution to the correspond-
ing HJB and then establish the uniqueness of a classical C2 solution to the HJB, see for
instance [GP05]. Here we adopt the second approach and claim that under any given ρ > 0,
v˜ derived above is the value function of problem (Control). The proof is similar to that for
the single-agent case in [GP05], therefore omitted here.
Step 2. Updating the price ρ and the locating the fixed point. Under any fixed
ρ > 0, the optimal controlled process xt is a geometric reflected Brownian motion within the
interval [x˜b, x˜s]. By [BW95], for any x ∈ [x˜b, x˜s], the scale density is given by
s(x) = exp
{
−
∫ x
θ
2δ
γ2y
dy
}
= θ
2δ
γ2 x
− 2δ
γ2 , ∀θ ∈ (x˜b, x˜s),
the speed density is
m(x) =
2
γ2x2s(x)
=
2
γ2θ
2δ
γ2
x
2δ
γ2
−2
,
and finally
M(x) =
∫ x
x˜b
m(y)dy =
2
γ2θ
2δ
γ2
x
2δ
γ2
−1 − x˜
2δ
γ2
−1
b
2δ
γ2
− 1 .
The density function of Px∞ , the limiting distribution of xt, is thus
f(x) =
m(x)
M(x˜s)
=
2δ
γ2
− 1
x˜
2δ
γ2
−1
s − x˜
2δ
γ2
−1
b
x
2δ
γ2
−2
, ∀x ∈ [x˜b, x˜s].
The updated price ρ¯ under the limiting distribution µ¯ = Law(x∞) is
ρ¯ = Γ(ρ) = a0 − a1
∫ x˜s
x˜b
x1−αf(x)dx = a0 − a1 2δ − γ
2
2δ − αγ2
x˜
2δ
γ2
−α
s − x˜
2δ
γ2
−α
b
x˜
2δ
γ2
−1
s − x˜
2δ
γ2
−1
b
= a0 − ρ · a1 2δ − γ
2
2δ − αγ2
y
2δ
γ2
−α
0 − 1
y
2δ
γ2
−1
0 − 1
2cα(yn0 − yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n− α) [yn0 − (1− λ)y0]
,
(17)
where the coefficient a1
2δ−γ2
2δ−αγ2
y
2δ
γ2
−α
0 −1
y
2δ
γ2
−1
0 −1
2cα(yn0−yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n−α)[yn0−(1−λ)y0]
does not rely on ρ. Clearly, for
a1 such that
a1 > 0, a1
2δ − γ2
2δ − αγ2
y
2δ
γ2
−α
0 − 1
y
2δ
γ2
−1
0 − 1
2cα(yn0 − yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n− α) [yn0 − (1− λ)y0]
< 1, (18)
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the mapping Γ is a contraction and therefore admits a unique fixed point
ρ∗ =
a0
1 + a1
2δ−γ2
2δ−αγ2
y
2δ
γ2
−α
0 −1
y
2δ
γ2
−1
0 −1
2cα(yn0−yα0 )
γ2p(1−m)(n−α)[yn0−(1−λ)y0]
. (19)
Substitute ρ∗ of (19) into (15) and (16), we can derive optimal action boundaries x˜∗b and x˜
∗
s.
Denote the singular control characterized by (x˜∗b , x˜
∗
s) as ξ
∗
· . Under Definition 2.1, (ξ
∗
· , ρ
∗) is
a solution to the game (MFG).
Remark 3.1. Note that under the assumption 2δ + γ2 < r, the uncontrolled process x =
{xt}t≥0 satisfies E
[∫∞
0
e−rtx2tdt
]
<∞, and this property is preserved for the controlled pro-
cess x∗ = {x∗t}t≥0 under ξ∗· , as it is restricted to a bounded region.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis and comparison with single-agent control
problem
As seen from (17), the iterations do not stop after the first round, indicating that the game
(MFG) demonstrates a genuine game effect from the weak interactions among the players.
Moreover, we can see that in the game (MFG), model parameters λ, δ, γ, r and α affect
both the optimal strategy of as in the single-agent control problem (2) and the equilibrium
price ρ∗.
To illustrate, consider the following case where δ = 1, γ = 2, r = 3, α = 0.6, λ = 0.6,
p = 0.5, c = 1, a0 = 1 and a1 = 0.1. Suppose the iterative process starts from a fixed value
ρ = 1. In the single-agent setting (2) where the price ρ = 1 is seen as exogenously given and
fixed, the optimal thresholds are given by xb = 0.053 and xs = 0.264. Figure 2 shows that
both xb and xs increase along with the value of ρ and the non-action region [xb, xs] expands.
In the game (MFG), in contrast, the equilibrium price is ρ∗ = 0.96 under which the optimal
thresholds are x˜∗b = 0.048 and x˜
∗
s = 0.239. Figure 3 shows the difference in the thresholds of
intervention between the single-agent control problem (2) and the game (MFG).
Impact of λ. λ ∈ (0, 1) measures the irreversibility of the investment: the closer λ to 1, the
more irreversible the investment. For the single-agent control problem (2) (Figures 4a and
4b), the expansion threshold xb stays relatively insensitive with respect to an increasing λ,
the contraction threshold xs however increases dramatically along with λ. This means that
for an individual company, if the investment is more irreversible, it becomes less profitable to
frequently decrease the production level; consequently, the contraction threshold is raised to
a higher level. Under the game (MFG) setting, the irreversibility does not have an immediate
impact on the optimal strategies (Figure 4c); instead, it drives down the equilibrium price
(Figure 4d). This suggests that as it becomes less profitable to reduce production when λ
approaches 1, companies in the game (MFG) tend to keep a higher production level and this
tendency collectively reduces the price due to the risk-aversion implied by the Cobb-Douglas
function.
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Figure 2: Thresholds under different values of ρ.
Figure 3: Single-agent v.s. MFG
Impact of δ and γ. The drift coefficient δ represents the expected growth rate of the
production and γ measures the volatility of the growth. The decision of whether or not to
adjust the production level is the trade-off between the running payoff cρxαt and the profit
from direct intervention p(1 − λ)dξ−t − pdξ+t , with α ∈ (0, 1). Without any intervention
within the time interval [t, t+ ∆t], xαt+∆t is given by
xαt exp
{
[αδ − γ
2
2
α(1− α)]∆t
}
exp
{
αγ(Wt+∆t −Wt)− α
2γ2
2
∆t
}
, (20)
therefore αδ− γ2
2
α(1−α) represents the expected growth rate of xαt . Under the single-agent
setting (2), when δ increases, the revenue function grows faster, leading to higher expansion
and contraction thresholds, as shown in Figures 5a and 5b. Moreover, the growth in δ has
larger impact on the contraction threshold xs compared to the the expansion threshold xb.
It also implies that each company tends to maintain a higher production level as δ grows.
Under the game (MFG), this tendency on the individual level is aggregated, driving down
the equilibrium price ρ∗, as shown in Figure 5d.
The impact of an increasing γ on both the single-agent control problem and the MFG can
be seen from the following two perspectives. As γ increases, the growth rate of the revenue
11
(a) Expansion threshold under different values
of λ: single-agent v.s. MFG
(b) Contraction threshold under different values
of λ: single-agent v.s. MFG
(c) MFG optimal thresholds versus λ (d) Equilibrium price versus λ
Figure 4: Impact of λ.
function αδ − γ2
2
α(1 − α) decreases, potentially causing lower expansion and contraction
thresholds. An increasing γ indicates a larger volatility in the growth rate of the production
level and the company can take advantage of the high volatility and reduce the frequency of
intervention, potentially decreasing the expansion threshold and increasing the contraction
threshold.
Under both perspectives, the expansion threshold is expected to decrease when γ in-
creases. But an increase in γ potentially has opposite effects on the contraction threshold.
In the single-agent control problem (2), the expansion threshold xb decreases as expected
(Figure 6a); the contraction threshold xs first increases and then decreases (Figure 6b). In
the game (MFG), the prevailing impact of a decreasing growth rate of xαt leads to higher the
equilibrium price ρ∗, as shown in Figure 6d.
Impact of r. In the single-agent control problem (2), as the discount rate r increases,
the revenue decays faster as time goes by, thus it becomes more beneficial to decrease the
production level for profit and consequently, a significant drop in the contraction threshold
in Figure 7b. In the game (MFG), the tendency of decreasing production for each company
ultimately drives up the equilibrium price, as shown in Figure 7d.
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(a) Expansion threshold under different values
of δ: single-agent v.s. MFG
(b) Contraction threshold under different values
of δ: single-agent v.s. MFG
(c) MFG optimal thresholds versus δ (d) Equilibrium price versus δ
Figure 5: Impact of δ.
Impact of α. α ∈ (0, 1) measures the elasticity of the profit with respect to the production.
Under the single-agent setting (2), both thresholds first increase and then decrease as α
approaches 1. In the game (MFG), the more sensitive the revenue with respect to production,
the lower the equilibrium price, as shown in Figure 8d.
4 Approximation of N-player game
In Section 3.2, we compare the solution to game (MFG) with the solution to the single-agent
control problem (2), and demonstrate the game effect by analyzing the impact of the model
parameters. In this section, we will show that the game (MFG) is an approximation of its
associated N -player game, in the sense of -NE.
Take the filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P) that supports a standard
Brownian motion W = {Wt}t≥0. Take N identical copies of the Brownian motion W ,
W i = {W it }t≥0 with i = 1, . . . , N , such that W i’s are i.i.d. and independent of W .
Suppose there are N companies participating in the game of partially reversible invest-
ment. For each company i, denote xi = {xit}t≥0 as its production level on R, with initial
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(a) Expansion threshold under different values
of γ: single-agent v.s. MFG
(b) Contraction threshold under different values
of γ: single-agent v.s. MFG
(c) MFG optimal thresholds versus γ (d) Equilibrium price versus γ
Figure 6: Impact of γ.
states xi0−
i.i.d.∼ µ0 ∈ P2(R). Similar to (3) and considering Remark 3.1, define the set of
admissible controls UN for each company,
UN =
{
(ξ+· , ξ
−
· ) : ξ
±
· adapted to F(W
1,...,WN ), nondecreasing, ca`dla`g,
ξ+0− = ξ
−
0− = 0, E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtdξ+t
]
<∞,
controlled process xt ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtx2tdt
]
<∞
}
,
(21)
where F(W 1,...,WN ) = {F (W 1,...,WN )t }t≥0 is the filtration generated by (W 1, . . . ,WN). For any
ξi· = (ξ
i,+
· , ξ
i,−
· ) ∈ UN , assume that the process xi = {xit}t≥0 is driven by
dxit = x
i
t(δdt+ γdW
i
t ) + dξ
i,+
t − dξi,−t , xi0− ∼ µ0. (22)
Here we consider a similar payoff function for each individual company as in problem
(2). However, unlike (2) where the price in the revenue function is exogenously given, here
in the N -player game ρi the price for company i is assumed to depend on the average of all
14
(a) Expansion threshold under different values
of r: single-agent v.s. MFG
(b) Contraction threshold under different values
of r: single-agent v.s. MFG
(c) MFG optimal thresholds versus r (d) Equilibrium price versus r
Figure 7: Impact of r.
its opponents’ limiting product levels
∑
j−1 x
j∞
N−1 , and the price is assumes to be determined by
the inverse demand function
ρ˜(x) = a0 − a1x1−α,
where a0, a1 are some positive constants with a1 satisfying (18).
Under a given set of other companies’ controls, ξ−i· = (ξ
1
· , . . . , ξ
i−1
· , ξ
i+1
· , . . . , ξ
N
· ), for any
x ∈ RN , the payoff function for company i, is given by
J i(x, ξi· ; ξ
−i
· ) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
c(xit)
α
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
ρ˜(xj∞)dt− pdξi,+t + p(1− λ)dξi,−t
] ∣∣∣∣x0− = x
]
, (23)
where x0− = (x10−, . . . , x
N
0−). The objective of company i is to choose the best control policy
ξ∗,i ∈ UN to maximize the above payoff. That is,
sup
ξi,+· ,ξ
i,−
· ∈UN
J i(x, ξi· ; ξ
−i
· ) (N-player)
subject to (22).
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(a) Expansion threshold under different values
of α: single-agent v.s. MFG
(b) Contraction threshold under different values
of α: single-agent v.s. MFG
(c) MFG optimal thresholds versus α (d) Equilibrium price versus α
Figure 8: Impact of α.
There are various solution criteria for an N -player game. In this section, we focus on the
notion of the Nash equilibrium (NE). An NE of an N -player game is a set of strategies of
all agents from which no players has the incentive to unilaterally deviate. More specifically,
Definition 4.1 (NE). ξ∗· = (ξ
∗,1
· , . . . , ξ
∗,N
· ) is called an NE to the game (N-player) if for any
i = 1, . . . , N ,
Eµ0
[
J i(x0−, ξ∗,i· ; ξ
∗,−i
· )
] ≥ Eµ0 [J i(x0−, ξi· ; ξ∗,−i· )] , ∀ξi· ∈ UN ,
where xk0−
i.i.d.∼ µ0, k = 1, . . . , N .
Solving for such an NE analytically is challenging especially when N is large. We will
show that the solution for the game (MFG) in Section (3.1) provides an approximation of
the game (N-player) in the following sense.
Definition 4.2 (-NE). For some  > 0, ξ∗· = (ξ
∗,1
· , . . . , ξ
∗,N
· ) is called an -NE to the game
(N-player) if for any i = 1, . . . , N ,
Eµ0
[
J i(x0−, ξ∗,i· ; ξ
∗,−i
· )
] ≥ Eµ0 [J i(x0−, ξi· ; ξ∗,−i· )]− , ∀ξi· ∈ UN ,
where xk0−
i.i.d.∼ µ0, k = 1, . . . , N .
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To see the approximation, first recall the definition of a solution (ξ∗· , ρ
∗) to the (MFG)
given by Definition 2.1 and its explicit form given in Section 3.1 characterized by the pair of
reflection boundaries and mean information (x˜∗b , x˜
∗
s, ρ
∗).
Now, for any company k = 1, . . . , N , consider the following admissible control policy
ξ¯k· characterized by the reflection boundaries (x˜
∗
b , x˜
∗
s) such that for the controlled process
x¯k = {x¯kt }t≥0, x¯kt ∈ [x˜∗b , x˜∗s] for almost all t ≥ 0. Fix a representative company i. Suppose
that for any j 6= i, company j decides to take the policy ξ¯j· ∈ UN . Then x¯j’s are i.i.d.;
moreover, according to Definition 2.1, the consistency condition of the solution to the game
(MFG) guarantees that ρ∗ = E[ρ˜(x¯j∞)].
Now denote the set of strategies consisting of ξ¯k· ’s by the following vector
ξ¯· = (ξ¯1· , . . . , ξ¯
N
· ). (24)
Then we have
Theorem 4.3. For any fixed N , ξ¯· given in (24) is an -NE to the game (N-player) where
 = O
(
1√
N
)
.
Proof. It suffice to show that
Eµ0
[
J i(x0−, ξ¯i· ; ξ¯
−i
· )
] ≥ sup
ξi·∈UN
Eµ0
[
J i(x0−, ξi· ; ξ¯
−i
· )
]−O( 1√
N
)
.
Note that the strategies of other companies are fixed as ξ¯j· , where j 6= i. By the continuity
of ρ˜(·) and boundedness of x¯j’s, ρ¯ :=
∑
j 6=i ρ˜(x¯
j∞)
N−1 is bounded by a sufficiently large number
R > 0. Therefore for any ξi· ∈ UN ,
J i(x, ξi· ; ξ¯
−i
· ) ≤ Ju,i(x, ξi· ; ξ¯−i· ) := E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
cR(xit)
αdt− pdξi,+t + p(1− λ)dξi,−t
] ∣∣∣∣x0− = x] .
From [GP05], clearly supξi∈UN J
u,i(x, ξi· ; ξ¯
−i
· ) is finite and
U := sup
ξi∈UN
Ju,i(x, ξi· ; ξ¯
−i
· ) <∞.
For some d > 0 such that U − d√
N
> 0, take ξˆi· ∈ UN such that J i(x, ξˆi· ; ξ¯−i· ) ≥ U − d√N and
denote the production level under policy ξˆi· by xˆ
i = {xˆit}t≥0. According to (21), there exists
L > 0 Eµ0
[∫∞
0
e−rt(xˆit)
2dt
]
< L. Consider ξi· ∈ UN such that the corresponding controlled
process xi satisfies
Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xit)
2dt
]
< L. (25)
Take such a control policy ξi· .
c(xit)
α
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
ρ˜(x¯j∞) = c(x
i
t)
α
{
ρ∗ +
∑
j 6=i [ρ˜(x¯
j
∞)− ρ∗]
N − 1
}
.
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Since x¯j· ∈ [x˜∗b , x˜∗s] almost surely, ρ˜(x¯i∞) is also bounded almost surely. For j 6= i, x¯j’s are
i.i.d., then
Eµ0
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i [ρ˜(x¯
j
∞)− ρ∗]
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Eµ0
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i [ρ˜(x¯
j
∞)− ρ∗]
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 12 = O( 1√
N
)
.
Therefore, ∣∣∣∣∣Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
c(xit)
α
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
ρ˜(x¯j∞)dt
]
− Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtcρ∗(xit)
αdt
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtc
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i [ρ˜(x¯
j
∞)− ρ∗]
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (xit)αdt
]
≤ Eµ0
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i [ρ˜(x¯
j
∞)− ρ∗]
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 12 Eµ0
[(∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xit)
αdt
)2] 12
≤ Eµ0
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i [ρ˜(x¯
j
∞)− ρ∗]
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 12 Eµ0 [1r
∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xit)
2αdt
] 1
2
,
where the last inequality is by the Jensen inequality. By (25), we have
Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xit)
2αdt
]
= Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xit)
2α
1{xit ≤ 1}dt
]
+ Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xit)
2α
1{xit > 1}dt
]
≤ r + Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(xit)
2dt
]
≤ r + L.
Therefore,
Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
c(xit)
α
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
ρ˜(x¯j∞)dt
]
= Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtcρ∗(xit)
αdt
]
+O
(
1√
N
)
.
In particular,
sup
ξi·∈UN
Eµ0
[
J i(x0−, ξi· ; ξ¯
−i
· )
]−O( 1√
N
)
≤ Eµ0
[
J i(x0−, ξˆi· ; ξ¯
−i
· )
]
= Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
c(xˆit)
α
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
ρ˜(xj∞)dt− γ+dξi,+t − γ−dξi,−t
]]
= Eµ0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
cρ∗(xˆit)
αdt− γ+dξi,+t − γ−dξi,−t
]]
+O
(
1√
N
)
≤ Eµ0
[
J i(x0−, ξ¯i· ; ξ¯
−i
· )
]
+O
(
1√
N
)
,
where the last inequality is due to the optimality of ξ¯i· according to Step 1 of Section 3.1.
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5 Conclusion and remarks
This paper analyzes a class of MFGs with singular controls motivated from the partially
reversible problem. It provides an explicit solution to the MFG, presents sensitivity analysis
to compare the solution to the MFG with that of the single-agent control problem, and
establishes its approximation to the corresponding N -player game in the sense of -NE, with
 = O
(
1√
N
)
.
The natural next step is to study the problem of convergence of the N -player game
to the associated MFG. Note that this problem has been studied for regular controls in
[Lac18, CR19, NSMT20]. It will be interesting to explore the case when controls are possibly
discontinuous.
Another class of stochastic games with possibly discontinuous controls is impulse control
games. Recently there are progresses in this direction, including [ABC+20] and [CDS20]
for explicit solutions of two-player games and [BCG20] showing solutions of impulse MFGs
being -NE for their corresponding N -player impulse games, with  = O( 1√
N
). Similar to
MFGs with singular controls, it is challenging to establish general NE structures for impulse
games, except for some special cases. The main challenge comes from the non-local operator
associated with impulse controls, even with one-dimensional state processes.
Finally, it is well known that under proper technical conditions, singular controls of finite
variation can be approximated by singular controls of bounded velocity. See for instance
[HHPY16]. More recently, [DF19] studies in an N -player game setting the convergence of
singular control of bounded velocity to that of finite variation, assuming sub-modularity of
the cost function and via the notion of weak NE. An immediate question is whether the
convergence relation holds in a MFG framework, and if so, under what form of equilibrium.
This is an intriguing question beyond the scope of this paper.
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